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Bullock: The History of Redistricting in Georgia

THE HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING IN
GEORGIA
Charles S. Bullock III*
In his memoirs, Chief Justice Earl Warren singled out
the redistrictingcases as the most significant decisions of
his tenure on the Court., A review of the changes
redistricting introduced in Georgia supports Warren's
assessment. Not only have the obligations to equalize
populations across districts and to do so in a raciallyfair
manner transformed the makeup of the state's collegial
bodies, Georgiahas provided the setting for multiple cases
that have defined the requirements to be met when
designing districts.
Other than the very first adjustments that occurred in
the 1960s, changes in Georgia plans had to secure
approval from the federal government pursuant to the
Voting Rights Act. Also, the first four decades of the
Redistricting Revolution occurred with a Democratic
legislature and governor in place. Not surprisingly, the
partisansin control of redistrictingsought to protect their
own and as that became difficult they employed more
extreme measures.
When in the minority, Republicans had no chance to
enact plans on their own. Beginning in the 1980s and
peaking a decade later, Republicans joined forces with
black Democrats to devise alternativesto the proposals of
white Democrats. The biracial,bipartisancoalition never
had sufficient numbers to enact its ideas. After striking
out in the legislature,African-Americans appealed to the
U.S. Attorney General alleging that the plans enacted
were less favorable to black interests than alternatives
Charles S. Bullock, III is a University Professor of Public and International Affairs at the
University of Georgia where he holds the Richard B. Russell Chair in Political Science and is
the Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor. He earned his Ph.D. and M.A. at
Washington University (St. Louis) and an A.B. from William Jewell College.
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offered by the coalition. Every iteration,save for the plans
drawn in the 1960s and 2011, bore the marks of what the
Departmentof Justice (DOJ)believed necessary to secure
equal treatment of African-Americans. As will become
clear in the course of this Article, the DOJ's perspective
has changed over time.
This Article is arrangedchronologically and examines
each of the major rounds of redistricting. Aside from
adjustingfor population shifts, which remain constant, a
different concern or theme dominated each round. In the
1960s, Georgia and other states were like individualswho
had begun flexing long-ignored muscles as they set about
adjusting lines that had gone unchanged for decades. In
the 1970s, as the need for redistricting merged with
demands from the Voting Rights Act, pushback occurred
as it did in the many other aspects of racialinteractionas
the nation finally began to take seriously its commitment
to equality. A decade later, Georgia encountered a DOJ
that had precise quantitative goals for what was
necessary to provide African-Americans an opportunity to
elect their preferences. In the 1990s, DOJ incorporated
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act into its preclearance
reviews and demanded that Georgia enhance the number
of majority-black districts and that it maximize the black
percentage in those districts. The turn of the new century
found the generations-longDemocraticcontrol of Georgia
slipping away and the majority party pulled out all the
stops desperately trying to cling to power. Democratic
efforts could not withstand the tide of partisan
realignment and court challenges so that in 2011
Republicans sat at the computer terminals and
redistrictedGeorgia. Republicans attempted to maximize
their control over the legislature by devising plans that
might produce super-majorities with two-thirds of the
seats in each chamber.
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I. IN THE BEGINNING

Prior to the Redistricting Revolution, virtually every legislative
body in the nation deviated from the one-person, one-vote
standard. 2 Some states had greater deviations than others, and
Georgia ranked toward the upper end of this distribution. 3 The
state House allotted at least one representative to each county with
the eight most populous getting two bonus seats and the next thirty
in size each having a pair of legislators. 4 State senators, with rare
exceptions, represented three-county districts with senators
selected on a rotation basis.5 Under this rule, with each election the
choice of the senator rotated to another county in the district with
only voters in that county allowed to vote so that every third election
even the least populous county selected a senator. 6 The least
populous Senate district had fewer than 15,000 residents; the most
populous-Fulton County, which was the only county to have a
senator to itself-had a population of 556,326 in 1960. 7
Congressional districts that had not been redrawn since the 1930
reapportionment shrank the delegation from twelve to ten.8
Advocates for what became known as the Redistricting
Revolution computed multiple measures to show how far state
legislative chambers deviated from having districts with equal
populations. The David and Eisenberg measure calculated the ratio

2
See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 105 (2000) ("Almost every state legislature in
the Union was malapportioned, as were the delegations to the U.S. House of
Representatives." (first citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 & n.2 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); then citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1976))).
' See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("It would be extraordinary to suggest that
in such statewide elections the votes of inhabitants of some parts of a State, for example,
Georgia's thinly populated Ninth District, could be weighted at two or three times the value
of the votes of people living in more populous parts of the State, for example, the Fifth District
around Atlanta.").
I GA. CONST. of 1945, art. III, § III, para. 1.
5 CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III ET AL., THE THREE GOVERNORS CONTROVERSY: SKULLDUGGERY,
MACHINATIONS, AND THE DECLINE OF GEORGIA'S PROGRESSIVE POLITICS 166 (2015)
[hereinafter BULLOCK, THREE GOVERNORS CONTROVERSY].
6 Id. Occasionally a county would pass on its turn as occurred in 1960 when Carl Sanders

was allowed to serve a second consecutive term in anticipation of his bid for statewide office.
Peyton McCrary & Steven F. Lawson, Race and Reapportionment, 1962: The Case of Georgia
Senate Redistricting, 12 J. POL'Y HIST. 293 (2000).
7

J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY'S DOORSTEP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE

SUPREME COURT BROUGHT "ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE" TO THE UNITED STATES 16 (2014).
8 Id. at 154.
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of the most to the least populous district.9 By this measure the most
populous Georgia House district had almost 100 times the
population of the least populous while the ratio in the Senate was
42.6 to one. 10 A second approach calculated the share of the
population represented by a majority of the legislature if one began
with the least populous district and worked up to a majority of the
chamber.11 By this measure just over a quarter of the population
could elect a majority in each of Georgia's chambers. 12 A more
complicated measure based on skewness and kurtosis of the
distribution of the population of legislative districts had a perfect
score of 100 if all districts had the same population. 13 Georgia
ranked next to last on this measure with a score of -4.14
Unlike other states, which gave an advantage to rural areas just
in the legislature, Georgia gave a similar advantage over the choice
of the leadership of the executive branch.1 5 Democratic primaries
for statewide and congressional positions required that winners
secure a majority of the county unit votes. 16 Each county had twice
as many unit votes as its House delegation.1 7 The county unit
system incentivized candidates for statewide office to seek support
in rural counties, many of which were boss-controlled, and ignore

9 See 2 PAUL T. DAVID & RALPH EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN
VOTE: A STATISTICAL INVESTIGATION OF LONG-TERM TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE
REPRESENTATION, at Introduction (1962) ("The concept of relative values of the right to

vote... measures the extent to which population size of legislative districts deviates from what
ideal state norms for legislative districts in each state legislative chamber should be.").
10 1 PAUL T. DAVID & RALPH EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN
VOTE: A STATISTICAL INVESTIGATION OF LONG-TERM TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE

REPRESENTATION 3 tbl.2 (1961).
11 See GORDON E. BAKER, RURAL VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL POWER 15, 16-17 tbl.1 (1955)

(showing Georgia as the state with the greatest underrepresentation of urban populations).
12 Id.
13 See Glendon Shubert & Charles Press, Measuring Malapportionment,58 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 302, 303 (1964) ("[WMe assume that what is to be measured is deviation from the ideal
of equal representation for populations of equal size.").
14 Id. at 326 tbl.1V.
15 See BULLOCK, THREE GOVERNORS CONTROVERSY, supra note 5, at 10 ("Statewide

candidates could win with exclusively rural support.").
16 See id. ('"inning nominations in the decisive Democratic primary for statewide offices
and in some congressional districts required accumulating [a majority of the] county unit
votes.").

17 See id. ("The 121 rural counties had a total of 242 unit votes and, if united, could easily
outvote the urbanized counties.").
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urban counties.18 Winning three counties with hundreds of voters
easily offset the loss of tens of thousands of city votes. 19
Following the Supreme Court decision in the Tennessee case,
Baker v. Carr,20 urban Georgia voters filed two suits. Sanders v.
Gray attacked the county unit system. 2 1 Toombs v. Fortson, like
Baker and litigation in many other states, challenged population
deviations in the state legislature.2 2 The courts decided quickly,
ruling against the county unit system 23 and ruling that one chamber
of the legislature must be based on population when the 1963
session convened. 24 A special session of the legislature acted with a
speed unimaginable today and redistricted the Senate,
necessitating a new round of Democratic primaries. 25
The 1962 plan eliminated the three-county districts and resulted
in Fulton County having seven districts while each of the other
major urban counties got at least two senators. 26 Allocating
senators to urban areas did more than simply produce a more urban
membership. The plan created two majority-black districts in
Fulton, one of which elected Leroy Johnson, the first AfricanAmerican legislator anywhere in the South in decades. 27 Joining
Johnson were three Republicans. 2 Heretofore Republicans got to
the Senate only when one of two mountain counties got to select a
senator.
In 1964 the Supreme Court extended the one-person, one-vote
standard to the second chamber of a state legislature 29 and to
congressional delegations, the latter ruling coming in a Georgia
18 See id. at 12 ("Candidates had an additional incentive to concentrate their efforts on
rural counties. Joseph L. Bernd estimates that at least twenty-one counties were bosscontrolled.").
19 See id. ("Successfully courting the sheriff or whoever yielded power in three rural
counties could take the place of the expensive and time-consuming investment needed to win
a six-vote county.").
20 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21 203 F. Supp. 158, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
22 205 F. Supp. 248, 249 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
23 Sanders, 203 F. Supp. at 170 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
24 Toombs, 205 F. Supp. at 259 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
25 See JIMMY CARTER, TURNING POINT 50-51 (1992) ("When the General Assembly
convened for the special session ... [i]t called for the fifty-four Senate nominees to be chosen
by majority vote in a special Democratic primary ... ").
26

1961-1962 GA. SECRETARY OF ST. OFFICIAL REGISTER 411.

27

CARTER, supra note 25, at 65 (1992).

28

CHARLES S. BULLOCK III, REDISTRICTING: THE MOST POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN AMERICA

141 (2010) [hereinafter BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING].

29 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
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case, Wesberry v. Sanders.30 Filed by a senator elected to one of the
recently-allocated Fulton districts, Wesberry resulted in splitting
the Fifth District, which had consisted of Fulton, DeKalb, and
Rockdale Counties, 31 and with 823,680 residents was the second
most populous of any congressional district in the nation.3 2 Two
33
years later, the DeKalb-based Fourth District chose a Republican.
Pursuant to Reynolds, Georgia drew new House districts. The
1965 special election diversified the chamber with the election of
twenty-three Republicans and seven African-Americans. 34 A second
redistricting took place prior to the 1968 election that made only
minor changes in the Senate but increased the number of multi35
county, multi-member House districts from seven to twenty-six.
With the 1968 remap, GOP ranks in the House swelled to twenty37
one 36 along with a dozen African-Americans.
Requiring population equalization strained the tradition of
basing representation on counties. In implementing the judicial
mandates, Georgia sought to maintain county-based representation
as much as possible. The post-Wesberry congressional plan kept
every county intact except for Fulton, which lost a sliver to bring up
the population of the new Fourth District. 38 The post-Toombs
Senate plan kept every district in a single county with Fulton
awarded seven seats, Chatham and DeKalb awarded three seats
39
each, and Bibb, Cobb, Muscogee, and Richmond awarded two each.
Each senator had a single-member district. 40 When the House
redistricted, many rural counties lost their representative but the
new districts respected county lines. 41 The plan allowed sixty-five
counties to elect at least one representative; other counties found
-

376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).

31 LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, A VOTING RIGHTS ODYSSEY: BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT IN
GEORGIA 89-90 (2003).
32 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 141.
33 1967-1968 GA. SECRETARY OF ST. OFFICIAL REGISTER 1674.
34 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 141.
35 Charles S. Bullock, III, Representation and Seat Distribution in Multi-County

Legislative Districts,GA. POL. SCI. ASS'N J., SEPT. 1974, at 29, 32 [hereinafter Bullock, MultiCounty Legislative Districts].
36 See 1969-1970 GA. SECRETARY OF ST. OFFICIAL REGISTER 1719-50 (showing twenty-one
victorious Republicans in the 1970 general election for the Georgia House of Representatives).
37 See id. at 407-519 (providing a full roster of the 1969-1970 Georgia House).
38 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
39 See 1963-1964 GA. SECRETARY OF ST. OFFICIAL REGISTER 367 (showing the 1962 Senate
reapportionment by county).
40 Bullock, Multi-County Legislative Districts, supra note 35, at 32.
41 Id. at 31.
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themselves in a multi-county district that elected one or more
legislators at-large. 42 The most populous counties in multi-member
districts usually achieved over-representation as they tended to win
a disproportionate share--often all--of the seats. 43 Few candidates
from smaller counties competed, and in some instances incumbents
from small counties in multi-county districts opted not to seek
reelection. 44 In urban areas, districts remained in a single county,
as with the Senate plan. 45 Some suburban counties with multiple
46
members, like Clayton and Fayette, elected legislators at-large.
More populous counties like Bibb, Chatham, DeKalb, Muscogee,
and Richmond had several multi-member districts.4 7 Fulton had
twenty-one single-member districts but also a floterial district that
48
elected three countywide.
Equalizing populations across districts resulted in more urban
legislators 49 and these new representatives raised the educational
51
level of the chambers.5 0 The average age of legislators declined
and the membership began slowly to diversify as African-Americans
and Republicans acquired seats. 52 The first round of redistricting
did not, however, facilitate the election of women. 53

42

Id.

43 Id. at 35.
44 Id. at 35-36.
45 See 1965-66 GA. SECRETARY OF ST. OFFICIAL REGISTER 366 (providing that there were

"three [representatives] from each of the eight largest populated counties").
46
See id. at 1703-04 (showing Clayton and Fayette Counties collectively electing
representatives for all three posts in District 35).
47 See id. at 1716-20 (showing Bibb County with one such district, Chatham with four,
and DeKalb, Muscogee, and Richmond with three each).
48 See id. at 1720-23 (showing twenty-two total Fulton County districts); see also id. at
584-85 (showing Fulton's District 123 divided between three posts).
49 Thomas R. Dye, The Impact of Reapportionment on the RepresentationAfforded Various
Constituencies in Georgia, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN GEORGIA 33, 33 (Brett W. Hawkins ed.,
1970) [hereinafter Dye, Various Constituencies].
50 Bullock, Multi-County Legislative Districts, supra note 13, at 40.
51 Thomas R. Dye, The Impact of Reapportionment on the Characteristicsof Georgia
Legislators, in

REAPPORTIONMENT

IN GEORGIA

43, 44 (Brett W. Hawkins ed.,

1970)

[hereinafter Dye, Characteristicsof Georgia Legislators].
52 See Dye, Various Constituencies,supra note 49, at 40-42 (discussing African-American
legislators); Dye, Characteristicsof Georgia Legislators, supra note 51, at 49-50 (discussing
both African-American and Republican legislators).
53 See Dye, Characteristicsof Georgia Legislators, supra note 51, at 49 ("Georgia is no
exception to the national pattern of feminine underrepresentation. Only two women served
in the House in 1965-66.").
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MAINTAINING WHITE SUPREMACY

The Civil Rights Revolution, which produced major legislation in
1964 and 1965, began bearing fruit just as the Redistricting
Revolution gathered speed. Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act
specified that states like Georgia, which had a literacy test or other
prerequisites to registration and in which less than half the voting
age population had registered or voted in the 1964 presidential
election, must get federal approval before implementing changes in
election laws. 54 Initially it was thought that only changes directly
impacting registration or voting needed preclearance, but in 1969
the Supreme Court interpreted Section 5 broadly to include all
changes that touched on the political process.5 5 Then in Georgia v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that Section 5 extended to
redistricting plans and that to prevail the creator of the plan had to
prove it was non-discriminatory.5 6 Although not part of the Georgia
v. United States decision, the standard for assessing the
57
acceptability of a redistricting plan was non-retrogression.
Applying this standard, the Department of Justice (DOJ) rejected
plans that eliminated majority-black districts by "cracking," or
58
dispersing a minority concentration among multiple districts.
Andy Young had run unsuccessfully for the Fifth Congressional
District in 1970. 59 Following release of the 1970 census, the
legislature redesigned the district at 38.3% black but excluded the
homes of both Young and Maynard Jackson, who had challenged
64 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) (2012) ("Any voting qualifications
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting that has
the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United
States on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
10303(f)(2) of this title, to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the
right to vote within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section.").
55 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969).
56 See 411 U.S. 526, 532, 538-539 (1973) (applying Section 5 to Georgia's redistricting plan
and holding it was reasonable for the plaintiff state to have the burden of proof).
57 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) ("[T]he purpose of § 5 has always
been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.").
58 See Noel H. Johnson, ResurrectingRetrogression:Will Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
Revive PreclearanceNationwide?, DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (2017) ("In practice,
the Department of Justice... would look to the status quo and then analyze whether the new
change in the law would diminish the electoral strength of minorities.").
59 Robert A. Holmes, Reapportionment Politics in Georgia:A Case Study, 45 PHYLON 179,
179 (1984) [hereinafter Holmes, Case Study (1984)].
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Senator Herman Talmadge in the 1968 Democratic primary.6 0 DOJ
objected, prompting the legislature to boost the district to 44.2%
black and include the homes of the two potential challengers. 61 In
1972, Young joined Houston's Barbara Jordan as the first AfricanAmericans elected to Congress from the South in the twentieth
62
century.
In an effort to reduce population deviations, plans for the General
Assembly implemented in 1972 began creating districts by
combining parts of counties, where districts previously had kept
counties whole. The new plan split twenty-six counties between
Senate districts and a third of the counties were split between
House districts. 63 Counties that had one or more legislators were
less likely to be in multi-county districts, and if they were divided it
was likely that at least one district would be wholly within the
county. 64 In rejecting the House plans, DOJ focused on the use of
numbered posts for multi-member districts and the majority-vote
65
requirement.
Despite taking steps toward greater population equality among
districts, Georgia had to redraw state legislative districts prior to
the 1974 election. The new maps created more majority-black
districts, which facilitated the election of five more AfricanAmericans to the lower chamber.6 6 The plan created twenty-four
House districts with black majorities, although no more than
twenty-one African-Americans were elected during the decade. 67
Republicans made no gains in either chamber during the decade as
they faced the challenges of Watergate and Carter's presidential
campaign.

60 Id.; see also Ronald Smothers, Maynard Jackson Wins in Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/05/us/maynard-jackson-wins-in-atlanta.html
(detailing Jackson's run for Senate).
61 Holmes, Case Study (1984), supra note 59, at 179 (discussing the legislative action).
62

BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 142.

61 Bullock, Multi-County Legislative Districts,supra note 35, at 41-42 n.16. Previously

only one House and two Senate districts were composed of parts of counties. Id.
6
Id. at 36 (outlining the scheme of division).
65 Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice Civil Rights
Div., to Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney Gen., State of Ga. 2 (Mar. 3 1972),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/05/30/GA-1 150.pdf.
66 MCDONALD, supra note 31, at 148.
67 Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss4/4

10

Bullock: The History of Redistricting in Georgia

2018]

REDISTRICTING IN GEORGIA

1067

III. THE 65% RULE
A new coalition appeared in the special session convened to draw
districts in the wake of the 1980 census. According to Rep. Robert
Holmes (D), a political science professor at Clark Atlanta
University, "Blacks and Republicans realized that they had mutual
interests in creating a majority Black 5th [Congressional] District
because it would offer the opportunity to elect a Republican in the
adjacent 4th District."68s Two ambitious senators were the key
players in the coalition, African-American Julian Bond (D) and Paul
Coverdell (R), who later served in the U.S. Senate.6 9 The coalition
of African-Americans and Republicans would be even more active in
the next round of redistricting.
To understand the environment in which the congressional
redistricting after the 1980 Census took place requires some
background. In 1977, the Supreme Court seemed to affirm a backof-the-envelope calculation that for a district to be likely to elect an
African-American it should be at least 65% black in total
population. 70 Although DOJ has denied ever operating under a 65%
rule, it played a major role in the assessment of Georgia's 1981
congressional plan. Going into the special session, Georgia's Office
of the Legislative Counsel advised, "The Justice Department
considers a district with a 65% minority population as one which is
capable of electing a minority candidate." 71 Much of the controversy
in this round of redistricting focused on the state's failure to attain
this threshold.
The district that elected Andy Young three times in the 1970s
was drawn to be 44.2% black.7 2 Due to population shifts, by the time
of the 1980 census, the district had a narrow 52% black majority but
had lost 10% of its population, leaving it underpopulated by about
125,000. 73 While Young had won in a majority-white district, Wyche
6
Robert A. Holmes, The Politics of Reapportionment, 1981: A Case Study of Georgia, 8
URB. RES. REV. 1, 2 (1982) [hereinafter Holmes, Case Study (1982)].
69 MCDONALD, supranote 31, at 169 (discussing Bond's introduction of the bill that created
a majority-black 5th District).
70 See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164 (1977) ("We
think it was reasonable for the Attorney General to conclude in this case that a substantial
nonwhite population majority-in the vicinity of 65%-would be required to achieve a
nonwhite majority of eligible voters.").
71 Holmes, Case Study (1984), supra note 59, at 181.
72 Holmes, Case Study (1982), supra note 68, at 1.
73 Id.
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Fowler, who is white, defeated John Lewis by 24 percentage points
in the special election to replace Young upon the latter's
confirmation as Ambassador to the United Nations. 74 In the next
two Democratic primaries, Fowler held off African-American
challengers. 75 In redrawing Fowler's district, the Legislative Black
Caucus (LBC) sought to maximize the black concentration and
76
offered plans that had the district well above 70% black.
The House plan avoided retrogression by keeping the black
concentration at 51.7%. 77 The Senate, in an agreement between the
sponsor Senator Julian Bond and Majority Leader Tom Allgood,
78
approved an alternative that made the Fifth District 69% black.
Bond agreed that he and the other black senator would not object to
lowering the black percentage in Allgood's Senate district from 50%
to 46% if Allgood could get the chamber to approve Bond's
congressional proposal. 79
After extensive wrangling and
considering at least twenty alternatives, the conference committee
approved a 57.1% black congressional district.8 0 Bond found the
conference plan unacceptable since, based on the most recent
election data, 54% of the registrants and 59% of the voters were
81
white.
DOJ acknowledged that the congressional plan passed the nonretrogression test, but the assistant attorney general asked why the
69% black alternative had been rejected.8 2 The rejection letter
suggested that the state intentionally kept the black percentage
lower "in order to dilute minority voting strength and to minimize
the chances of that community's electing a candidate of its choice to
Congress." 8 3 DOJ rejected the state's justification for why the Fifth

Id.
William E. Schmidt, Incumbents Winning Georgia Democratic Primary, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
15, 1984),
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/15/us/incumbents-winning-georgiademocratic-primary.html.
76 Holmes, Case Study (1984), supra note 59, at 182.
7- Holmes, Case Study (1982), supra note 68, at 2.
7s Holmes, Case Study (1984), supra note 59, at 182.
79 Holmes, Case Study (1982), supra note 68, at 2.
80 Holmes, Case Study (1984), supra note 59, at 183.
74

75

s' Id. at 184.
82 Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice Civil

Rights Div., to Michael Bowers, Attorney Gen., State of Ga. 2 (Feb. 11, 1982),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/05/30/GA- 1870.pdf
[hereinafter
DOJ Rejection Letter (Feb. 11, 1982)].
83

Id.
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District had not included south DeKalb's growing black electorate.8 4
The state had explained that it was trying to fashion new districts
along the lines of their predecessors as much as possible and
therefore had retained the Fulton-DeKalb line to separate the
Fourth and Fifth Districts.8 5 Democrats, sensitive to Coverdell's
6
strategy, wanted to keep the Fourth District at least 20% black.
Following DOJ's rejection, Georgia sought approval from the
District Court of the District of Columbia in Busbee v. Smith.8 7 The
three-judge panel also rejected the plan concluding that there was
no non-discriminatory explanation for the failure to approve a more
heavily black district.8 8
To justify a finding of intentional
discrimination, the court pointed to the statement by the chair of
the House Redistricting Committee, "I don't want to draw n*****
districts."8 9 Other evidence included the failure of the conference
committee to include legislators who had voted for the more heavily
black Fifth District, the exclusion of African-Americans from the
conference committee, and the opposition of legislative leaders to
higher black percentages in the Fifth District. 90 The state had
ignored a warning from DOJ "that because a larger percentage of
whites vote than do blacks, for blacks to cast a majority of votes in
a given election, at least 65% of the population in a district would
have to be black." 91
After the Supreme Court affirmed, 92 a special session of the
legislature upped the Fifth District black population to 65.02% with
almost 60% of the registrants African-American, and DOJ
approved. 93 The Fifth District reelected Fowler despite its much
higher black concentration until he ran for the Senate. 94 John Lewis
won the open seat over Portia Scott in 1986. 95 Two years earlier the
Fourth District, where the black population had fallen from 28% to
94

Id.

s5

Id.

86

BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 144.

549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
at 498.
89 Id. at 501.
87

88 Id.

0 Id. at 518.
91 Id. at 501.

Busbee v. Smith, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
93 Holmes, Case Study (1984), supra note 59, 186-187.
92

94 Fowler,

Wyche,

Jr.

(1940-), BIOGRAPHICAL

DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS,

http:/bioguide.congress.gov/scriptsbiodisplay.pl?index=fOO0329 (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
95 DALLAS L. DENDY, JR., STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 4,
1986, H.R. DOC. NO. 65-752, at 9 (1987).
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11%, saw Republican Pat Swindall oust the Democratic
96
incumbent.
The LBC and GOP also worked together on plans for the General
Assembly and urged DOJ to reject the legislature's plans, which did
little to promote black representation. 97 DOJ largely accepted the
legislative plans, limiting its concerns to two Senate districts and
the House plan for Dougherty County.9 8 The 1970s plan had had
thirty majority-black House districts and eight in the Senate; the
LBC devised a new plan with forty-three total majority black
districts.9 9 In 1982, blacks added two Senate seats but made no
gains in the House.1 0 0 Black Senate gains coincided with the
creation of six more majority-black districts after keeping the
number at two for years. 10 1 Republicans also added a brace of
10 2
Senate seats but held constant with twenty-four in the House.
During the decade when these plans were in place, both of the allies
saw their ranks swell as the LBC grew by four senators and six
representatives. 10 3 The GOP added four senators and expanded to
10 4
thirty-five representatives.
IV. MAXBLACK
The 1990s saw the strange bedfellows' coalition that first
appeared a decade earlier come to full flower. Black and Republican
legislators wanted more seats and the seats they coveted had white
Democratic occupants. The LBC, however, was divided in how
5
aggressively to push for more seats. 10
Republicans,
distrustful
of
the
state's
Legislative
Reapportionment Office, invested in the software and hardware
96 THOMAS E. LADD, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS OF
NOVEMBER 6, 1984, at 12 (1985).

9- See Holmes, Case Study (1984), supra note 59, at 180-82 (describing the nature of the
LBC's and GOP's cooperation).
98 DOJ Rejection Letter (Feb. 11, 1982), supra note 82, at 2-3.
99 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note R, at 145.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 143 tbl.6.1, 145 (showing two majority-black districts from 1974 to 1980, but
eight in the 1982 plan).
102 See Charles S. Bullock III, Redistricting and Changes in the Partisanand Racial
Composition of Southern Legislatures, 19 ST. & LOC. GOV'T REV. 62, 65 tbl.3 (1987) (showing
Republican stagnation in several states houses-including Georgia's-but relative growth in
state senates).
103
BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note R, at 170-71.
104 Id. at 153.
105 Id. at 147.
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needed to design redistricting plans.10 6 Republicans offered use of
their equipment to the LBC, and its attorney Kathy Wilde and Rep.
Cynthia McKinney spent hours at the GOP facility testing multiple
configurations with the goal of maximizing the number of districts
10 7
likely to elect African-Americans, including Rep. McKinney.
Republicans were also busy using the mapping software trying to
get more districts they could win. Since the GOP drew support
almost exclusively from whites, attainment of the party's goals
10 8
involved bleaching districts by aggregating black concentrations.
The 1990 reapportionment awarded Georgia an eleventh
congressional district.10 9 In the special session convened late in the
summer of 1991, Democrats created a new 60.6% black-majority
district by linking African-American concentrations in south
DeKalb, Augusta, and Macon. 110 This plan also had a 39.5% black
Second District in southwest Georgia and maintained the black
Black Caucus leaders like Mike
majority in the Fifth District.'
Thurmond and Calvin Smyre recognized the potential costs for the
Democratic Party associated with creating more majority-black
districts and approved the map that, in the Senate, came out of a
committee chaired by an African-American. 112 Thurmond and Gene
who chaired the Senate
Walker, the African-American
Reapportionment Committee, defended the maps in meetings with
DOJ attorneys." 3 But a minority of the LBC, led by Reps. Cynthia
McKinney and Tyrone Brooks sought to maximize the number of
114
majority-black districts.
According to rumors, since the addition of a majority-black
district was obviously not retrogression, DOJ was on the verge of
approving the plan.1 1 5 Accounts differ over who discovered a way to
106
See id. at 146-47 (detailing the Republicans' use of technology in the new decade, as
an effort to avoid trusting the Legislative Reapportionment Office).
107 See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1361-67 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (recounting this
coordinated effort), a/fid, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
108 See BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 147 (discussing the resulting plan,
which included three heavily consolidated majority-black districts).
'09 Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1360.
110 Id. at 1363 n.5.
111 Id.
112

TOMMY HILLS, RED STATE RISING: TRIUMPH OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN GEORGIA 56-

57 (2009).
113 Id.
at 57.
114 Id.
at 56.
115 See BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 147 ("The careerists at DOJ had long
Republicans named by President
supported increasing the numbers of black officials ....
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create a third majority-black congressional district. Some credit
House Republican Bart Ladd, others say Rep. McKinney came up
with the plan, 116 and the opinion invalidating part of the plan
credited Kathy Wilde, the ACLU attorney working with the Black
Caucus. 117 Regardless of who first figured out that a district
stretching from DeKalb to Savannah while picking up Augusta's
black population would create another majority-black district in
southwest Georgia, it was either Ladd, a Delta pilot, or Bob Holmes
who took the alternative to DOJ.118 The map showed the three
majority-black districts but had not fleshed out the other eight
districts.1 1 9 Ladd was given a weekend to see if he could fit in the
other districts, a challenge that required several all-nighters. 20
The plan with three majority-black districts had to be transmitted
from the GOP computer to the state computer. 12 1 In the days before
the Internet, transferring a file involved downloading it to a floppy
disk and inserting it into another computer. 122 At that time, file
names could contain no more than eight characters.1 23 The file that
Republicans took to the Capitol had the name MAXBLACK. 124
DOJ rejected the state's two-district proposal for not maximizing
black concentrations in the two majority-black districts.1 25 DOJ also
questioned the failure to increase the black percentage in the
southwest corner district. 126 In rejecting the plan for the state
House, the letter incorporated language from Section 2 noting that
alternatives had been proposed that "provide black voters more
effectively with an opportunity to participate in the political process

George H.W. Bush to run the Justice Department saw how promoting black interests could
also advance the GOP .
.
116 Id.

at 146.

117 Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 1994), affid, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
11s BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 146; Robert A. Holmes, Reapportionment
Strategies in the 1990s: The Case of Georgia, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990s, at

191, 197 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Holmes, Reapportionment Strategies].
119 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 146.
120

Id. at 146-47.
at 147.

121 Id.

122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.

125 Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div.,
to Mark H. Cohen, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen., State of Ga. 5-6 (Jan. 21, 1992),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/O5/30/GA-2330.pdf
[hereinafter
DOJ Rejection Letter (Jan. 21, 1992)].
126 Id. at 5.
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and to elect candidates of their choice." 127 DOJ criticized plans for
both chambers of the General Assembly for protecting white
incumbents rather than drawing additional majority-black
128
districts.
The General Assembly came up with a new plan that increased
the black concentration in the Second Congressional District from
39.4% to 49.1% by adding Columbus' black population. 29 DOJ
rejected this plan on March 20, 1992.130 This second rejection letter
raised the ante for the southwest district by asking why Macon's
black population was not included.13 1 Shifting Macon's AfricanAmericans into the Second District would remove them from the
Eleventh District.32 DOJ's objection letter broached a concern not
in the first rejection as it called on the state to incorporate the black
population of Screven, Effingham, and Chatham Counties into the
Eleventh District.13 3 DOJ's letter observed that such a plan had
13 4
passed the Senate but not the House.
DOJ rejected the state House plan for not creating three
majority-black districts around Muscogee and Chattahoochee
Counties, two majority-black districts in Houston County, or a
Richmond County delegation having equal numbers of black and
white legislators. 135 The Senate plan failed to satisfy DOJ demands

127 Id. at 3. In place of "candidates" Section 2 has "representatives." Voting Rights Act of
1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012).
128 DOJ Rejection Letter (Jan. 21, 1992), supra note 125, at 3-5.
129 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 148.
130 Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Div.,
to Mark H. Cohen, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen., State of Ga. 4 (Mar. 20, 1992),
https://www.justice.gov/sitesldefaultlfiles/crtlegacy/2014/05/30/GA-2360.pdf
[hereinafter
DOJ Rejection Letter (Mar. 20, 1992)].

134

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.

135

Id.

131
132
133

at 2. County delegations determine the fate of local legislation, i.e., legislation

affecting a single county, a practice known as local courtesy. Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule
and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102
YALE L.J. 105, 121 (1992). Redistricting plans regularly take this into consideration and
design configurations likely to give the majority party a majority of the legislators from multimember urban counties. See id. at 162 (noting that Georgia's 1991 reapportionment plan had
the result that "[t]he [local] delegation's expansion to include a fourth white member, coupled
with the prevailing practice of local courtesy, could neutralize black voting strength in
Dougherty County because this new white legislator could vote with the other white member
of the delegation to thwart the desires of black residents in Dougherty County").
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for one additional majority-black district in DeKalb and another one
136
in southwest Georgia.
Receipt of the second rejection letter came near the end of the
legislative session. 137 Rather than holding a special session, the
General Assembly hurriedly made changes to all three plans and
finally succumbed to DOJ demands by creating a third majorityblack congressional district, with Speaker Tom Murphy providing
the critical ninety-first vote. 138 To maximize the black percentage
in the southwest district after adding heavily black areas of Macon,
two teams went around the district's boundary adding majorityblack census blocks and excluding majority-white ones. 139 This
third iteration of the congressional map rendered Atlanta's Fifth
District 62% black, the Second District in the southwest corner 57%
black, and the Eleventh District that stretched from DeKalb to
140
Savannah 64% black.
In line with the MAXBLACK approach, the state Senate plan
DOJ approved had thirteen majority-black districts, up from eight
in the plan drawn a decade earlier.1 4 1 The House plan had forty-one
majority-black districts, an increase of twelve.1 42 Tyrone Brooks,
one of the LBC leaders demanding more black districts, celebrated:
143
"We got 98 percent of what we were fighting for."
The majority-black congressional districts performed and
Georgia sent three African-Americans to Congress. 144 Republicans
benefitted from bleaching districts adjacent to the ones that elected
African-Americans, and three new Republicans joined Newt
Gingrich in Congress in 1993.145 Two years later, three more
Republicans won election but these successes did not come
exclusively in districts bleached to create the Second and Eleventh
Districts.1 46 However, redistricting had a role. Political scientists
John Petrocik and Scott Desposato attribute some of the GOP
136 DOJ Rejection Letter (Mar. 20, 1992), supra note 125, at 2-3.
137 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 149.
138

Id.

139 Id.

140

at 149-50.
Id. at 149.

141 Holmes, ReapportionmentStrategies, supra note 118, at 206.
142
Id.
143 Bob Holmes, Reapportionment/RedistrictingPolitics in Georgiain the 1990s and 20012002, in VOTING RIGHTS AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION: REDISTRICTING, 1992-2002, at 87,
91 (David A. Bositis ed., 2006).
144

Id.

145 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 151; see also infra Table 1.
146 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 152.
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successes in the South in the 1994 election to the extreme
disruptions as distant black populations were united to form
frequently non-compact districts. 147 White Democratic members of
Congress, who emerged from redistricting with drastically altered
districts, had insufficient time to develop ties with their new
constituents before the wave election that gave Republicans their
first House majority in decades. 148 After Nathan Deal changed
parties in the spring of 1995, Georgia's congressional delegation had
eight Republicans and three African-American Democrats. 149 The
1992 collaboration had advanced the interests of both members but
Republicans had been the bigger winners. In the course of less than
two and a half years, Georgia's congressional delegation had gone
from eight white Democrats, one black Democrat, and one
1 50
Republican, to three black Democrats and eight Republicans.

Table

1151

COMPARISON OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS BEFORE
AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF 1992 REDISTRICTING

Percent Black
New
District Old

Legislator
Old

New

Year of
Change

1

32

23

Thomas (D)

Kingston (R)

1992

2

37

57

Hatcher (D)

Biship (D)

1992

3

35

18

Ray (D)

Collins (R)

1992

4

25

12

Jones (D)

Linder (R)

1992

147John R. Petrocik & Scott W. Desposato, The Partisan Consequences of MajorityMinority Redistricting in the South, 1992 and 1994, 60 J. POLS. 613, 616 (1988).
148 Id.
149 GeorgiaRep. Nathan Deal Moves to GOP, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1995,
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-04-11/news/mn-53466-1-nathan-deal.
150

Id.

151 See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1992,

at 304-26 (Eleanor D. Evans ed. 1991) (providing pre-1992 demographic data and
representatives for Georgia's ten congressional districts) [hereinafter BARONE & UJIFUSA,
ALMANAC 1992]; MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS

1994, at 334-58 (Eleanor Evans ed. 1993) (providing demographic data and representatives
for Georgia's congressional districts, including the newly granted Eleventh District, following
the 1992 reapportionment) [hereinafter BARONE & UJIFUSA, ALMANAC 1994].
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5

67

62

Lewis (D)

Lewis (D)

N/A

6

20

6

Gingrich (R)

Gingrich (R)

N/A

7

9

13

Darden (D)

Barr (R)

1994

8

36

21

Rowland (D)

Chambliss (R)

1994

9

5

4

Jenkins (D)

Deal (D/R)*

1995

10

23

18

Barnard (D)

Johnson (D)
Norwood (R)

1992
1994

11

N/A

64

N/A

McKinney (D)

N/A

*Nathan Deal changed parties in April 1995.1

2

The prolonged tug-of-war with DOJ and the need to debate
numerous plans sowed seeds of dissention among Democrats.
Heretofore, the Democratic leadership had succeeded in tamping
down racial differences and getting their members to promote
education and other programs that widely distributed benefits
without regard to race. 153 But LBC demands for more majorityblack districts and the neighboring whiter districts electing more
Republicans brought racial tensions among Democrats to the
surface. 15 4 Racial divisions became more apparent and colored even
some types of decisions that had not been seen as racial in the
past.155
When the Supreme Court responded to Duke Professor Robinson
Everett's challenge to North Carolina's 1-85 district and held that
the concerns raised were justiciable, 156 critics of Georgia's
congressional plan filed a challenge to the Eleventh District. 15 7 As
part of a stinging rebuke of DOJ, the three-judge panel criticized as
"an embarrassment" and "an impropriety" the cozy relationship
between DOJ and Kathy Wilde, the ACLU attorney who advocated
GeorgiaRep. Nathan Deal Moves to GOP,supra note 149.
Interview with Mark Burkhalter, Ga. House of Representatives (Feb. 18, 1993);
Interview with Matt Towery, Georgia House of Representatives (June 15, 1993); Interview
with Cathy Cox, Sec'y of State (October 22, 1993).
154
Interview with Mark Burkhalter, supra note 153; Interview with Matt Towery, supra
note 153; Interview with Cathy Cox, supra note 153.
15 Interview with Mark Burkhalter, supra note 153; Interview with Matt Towery, supra
note 153; Interview with Cathy Cox, supra note 153.
15 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649-50 (1993).
17 2nd DistrictHas to Be Redrawn, Judges Rule, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 2, 1995, at D10.
The Second District was subsequently successfully challenged. Id.
152
153
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the three-district solution for members of the Black Caucus, and the
amnesia that had wiped out the memories of the Justice
Department attorneys. 158 In Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court
elaborated on the Shaw opinion, which emphasized the shape of
North Carolina's Twelfth District. 15 9 The Miller court identified the
problem occurring when "race for its own sake, and not other
districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and
controlling rationale in drawing its district lines."1 60 Applying this
standard, the Court upheld the district court's finding that
1 61
Georgia's Eleventh District was unconstitutional.
The court focused on the constitutionality of the plan. But in the
deposition that Assistant Attorney General John Dunne gave in
Miller, he acknowledged a partisanship motivation behind DOJ
pressure for MAXBLACK:
You know, I can't tell you that I was sort of like a monk hidden
away in a monastery with only the most pure of intentions. I
am a Republican. I was part of a Republican administration.
And to tell you that at no moment during the course of my
[career], the discharge of my responsibilities, was I totally
immune or insensitive to political consideration, I don't think
16 2
would justify anybody's belief.
At trial Dunne acknowledged that before Georgia had prepared
plans he met with leaders of the NAACP to point out that the
NAACP and Republicans could pursue a mutually beneficial
63
strategy.1
The challenge to replace the discredited congressional map
proved insurmountable for the legislature. The LBC demanded "3
seats, no retreat."1 64 Republicans and black clergy who had
promoted the unconstitutional plan continued to call for three

158 Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1368 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
159Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910-15 (1995).
160 Id. at 913.
161 Id. at 917.

162BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supranote 28, at 72 (citing Deposition of John Dunne at 22,
Johnson, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (No. 194-008)).
163Rhonda Cook, 11th District Suit Looks at Justice DepartmentRole, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
July 24, 1994, at B3.
16 Holmes, Reapportionment Strategies,supra note 118, at 213.
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majority-black districts. 165 Speaker Tom Murphy tried to unite the
Democratic Party, which had splintered along racial lines in 1991
and 1992, and hoped to see the legislature adopt a replacement plan
with a pair of majority-black districts, musing that some of his
colleagues "don't understand we need to comply with the court
decision." 166 As the House struggled to come up with a three-district
plan that would satisfy judicial concerns, the Senate passed a plan
16 7
with a single majority-black district.
The debate over how many majority-black districts a plan should
have further strained racial bonds in the Democratic Party. 168 The
concerns were fueled by the belief that African-Americans needed
majority-black districts to win. 169 Proposals that would leave only
John Lewis with a black majority prompted an outburst from Rep.
Billy McKinney, whose daughter represented the unconstitutional
Eleventh District: "It's racism.... That crowd would rather have no
black elected officials." 170 Black political scientist Robert Holmes
claimed, "white Democrats are not willing to go to the mat, so to
speak, to protect [black members of Congress] or assist them."1 71
Some black leaders called on African-Americans to vote against
white Democratic legislators who had not demanded more majority172
black districts.
Once the legislature gave up, the trial court prepared a
replacement that reunited all but six of the two-dozen counties split

165 Ken Foskett & Kathey Alexander, Redistricting Foes to Meet Today, ATLANTA J.CONST., July 15, 1995, at C3; James Salzer, Black Clergy Fight to Keep 3 Districts,ATHENS
BANNER-HERALD, July 22, 1995, at 1A, 10A; Mark Sherman, Blacks, GOP Work to Save
Districts,ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 1, 1995, at B1.
166 Mark Sherman, Murphy Says Redrawing Effort Likely to Fail; Others 'Not Ready to
Give Up,' ATLANTA J. -CONST., Aug. 10, 1995, at B1.
167 Holmes, Reapportionment Strategies, supra note 118, at 215-16.
168 Pigs Get Fat; Hogs Get Slaughtered, 9 BILL SHIPP'S GA., Sept. 18, 1995, at 1-2; Tom
Baxter, New Year Blows in Two-Party Politics,ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 8, 1996, at B4.
169 Mark Sherman & Kathey Alexander, Map Called a Disasterfor Black Voters, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Dec. 14, 1995, at D4.
170 James Salzer, Number of Black Districts Cut in Reapportionment Proposals, ATHENS
BANNER-HERALD, Aug. 11, 1995, at 6; see also Jeff Dickerson, Editorial, Is Payback for Party
Loyalty Just One District?,ATLANTA J., Aug. 16, 1995, at A16 (w"e ought to be able to [fix the
Eleventh District] without destroying coalitions and diluting voting gains.").
171 Mark Sherman, DilutingBlack Votes for a Stronger Voice, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 17,
1995, at G3.
172 James Salzer, Blacks Target Democrats in Redistricting Battle, ATHENS BANNERHERALD, Mar. 23, 1996, at 8A.
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173
in the unconstitutional plan, but it had only one black district.
The replacement plan substantially reduced black concentrations in
two districts represented by African-Americans. 174 The ACLU and
DOJ challenged this plan as retrogressive and asked for a second
black district. 175 The Supreme Court rejected the claim. 176 In
explaining why it accepted the one-district plan, the high court
pointed to the last constitutional plan, which dated from 1982 and
had one black district so that the new plan did not reduce the
number of majority-black districts. 177 DOJ, which also objected to
the state's earlier plans, had no basis for demanding two black
districts since it had rejected that solution when offered by the state
in 1992.178 Efforts to get a second majority-black district failed to
meet the first prong from Thornburg v. Gingles17 9 since Georgia's
black population was not sufficiently concentrated. 180

Table

2181

AFRICAN-AMERICAN CONCENTRATIONS IN AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS BASED ON 1990
POPULATIONS (all numbers in percent)

District

Previous Plan

1992 Plan

Post-Miller Plan

2

37

57

39

5

67

62

62

11*

N/A

64

37

173 See Miller v. Johnson, 922 F. Supp. 1557, 1570-71 app. A (S.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd sub
nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (showing the Fifth District as the only majorityblack district).
174 See infra Table 2.
175 Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 83 (1997).
176 Id. at 90.
177 Id. at 97.
178 Id. at 80.
179 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
180 Abrams, 521 U.S. at 90-92.
181 See BARONE & UJIFUSA, ALMANAC 1992, supra note DB, at 306, 313 (providing pre-1992
concentration levels); BARONE & UJIFUSA, ALMANAC 1994, supra note DB, at 337, 344, 357

(providing 1992 concentration levels); MICHAEL BARONE ET AL., THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN

POLITICS 2000, at 465, 470, 473 (Eleanor Evans ed. 1999) (providing post-Millerconcentration
levels).
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*Georgia received an 11th district pursuant to the 1990 reapportionment. The remedial
plan from 1996 renumbered District 11 to District 4 and the 1996 figure in the table is for
District 4.

Concerns that African-Americans could not win in the new
configurations proved inaccurate. Both McKinney and Sanford
Bishop continued to win reelection easily.18 2 The success in these
districts with white majorities foreshadowed the claims that have
been made increasingly by civil rights groups: with so many whites
voting in GOP primaries, African-Americans do not need majorityblack districts to win, and black concentrations once demanded by
the Department of Justice now often constitute packing.
In the wake of the Miller decision, Georgia Attorney General
Mike Bowers warned the legislature that it needed to review the
state legislative maps or be prepared to defend some of the districts
against challenges.18 3 The attorney who brought Miller believed
that a dozen Senate districts, and twice as many in the House, were
vulnerable.18 4 The legislature accepted Bowers' challenge and came
up with a configuration that protected all senators even before the
unsuccessful effort to design a new congressional map.18 5 The
number of majority-black Senate districts declined by two to eleven
and four majority-black House districts were eliminated, leaving
thirty-seven.1 8 6 Under the new plans, each chamber welcomed an
additional African-American while Republicans picked up eight
seats in the House and gained one senator.187
V. SAVE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Although Democrats still dominated the General Assembly and
held most statewide constitutional offices, political allegiances were
changing. Republicans had held the majority of the congressional
delegation since 1995.188 The 1990s' greatest population growth had
182
183

BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 156.
M. Elizabeth Neal, Remap Panels to Start from Scratch, 8 BILL SHIPP'S GA., July 17,
1995, at 3.
184 James Salzer, Redistricting Battle Headed to High Court, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD,
Jan. 27, 1996, at 16A.
18
BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 156.
186

Id.

187

Id.

188

Id. at 157.
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come in areas where Republicans did well, while the population in
Democratic areas had often stagnated and, in some places, actually
declined.1 8 9 Compounding the challenge facing Democrats, who
would redraw the state in 2001, was that in each of the three most
recent elections, Republicans won a majority of the statewide vote
for both the state House and Senate. 190 Yet due to the maps in place,
Democrats retained about 60% of the seats. 191 The GOP effort to
win a Senate majority in 2000 fell short as they won twenty-four
1 92
seats but lost another five by a combined total of 1,200 votes.
David Ralston has characterized the Democrats' challenge in 2001
as an "attempt to hang on to their majorities in a gravity defying
way."'1 93 Any hope of maintaining majorities tinder the Gold Dome
would require extraordinary gerrymandering.

Table

3194

GEORGIA GOP PERCENTAGES OF VOTES AND SEATS
House

Senate
Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats

Both Chambers Redistricted
52
51
55

1996
1998
2000

39
39
43

51
53
52

41
43
42

Both Chambers Redistricted
55
57
67

2002
2004
2006

189

Id.

190

Id.

46
61
61

52
57
59

41
53
59

191 See infra Table 3.
192 HILLS, supra note 112, at 83.

193Telephone interview by Joshua Bearden with David Ralston, Ga. House of
Representatives (Nov. 2, 2017).
194 See generally Current and Past Election Results, GA. SECY OF STATE,
http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/Elections/current-and-past elections-results (last visited May
26, 2018).
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With so much at stake, Governor Roy Barnes became much
more involved than previous governors in redistricting. 195 He
sought to sail against the tide and expand Democratic seats in the
General Assembly and enable Democrats to win nine seats in the
expanded thirteen-member congressional delegation. 196 The Senate
map was drawn under Barnes' supervision and accepted with few,
if any, changes. 197 Republicans had no input and even Democrats
were kept out of the process; simply shown a draft with a warning
that, if they objected, their district would be made worse. 198 In the
House, Speaker Tom Murphy pushed back and made changes to
protect his friends, even at his own expense.1 9 9
Unlike in the two previous decades, a united Democratic Party
faced the challenge as the LBC declined the invitation to join forces
with GOP legislators. Even as the post-Miller redistricting was
underway, some recognized that the LBC coalition with
Republicans had been a pact with the devil. Sen. Charles Walker
fretted that: 'We're helping elect Republicans, and they're not
helping us." 200 David Bositis of the Joint Center for Political
Studies, a black think tank, characterized the Republican gains that
resulted from MAXBLACK as "arguably the biggest loss of black
political power, ever."20 1 The LBC, whose members chaired seven
Senate and five House committees including the powerful Rules
Committee, recognized that these and the associated influence over

195See HILLS, supra note 112, at 90 ("[Bob] Irvin also criticized Roy Barnes .... 'There
had never been a reapportionment session where the governor had gotten so involved ..."').
In contrast Zell Miller took no part in efforts to adjust congressional or state legislative
district boundaries in the mid-1990s. Slaughter on Capitol Square: Democrats Dig in for
Republican Onslaught, 8 BILL SHIPP'S GA., Aug. 14, 1995, at 2.
196 Interview with Bryan Tyson, Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP, in Athens, Ga. (Nov.
8, 2007) [hereinafter Interview with Bryan Tyson (Nov. 8, 2007)].
197
See HILLS, supra note 112, at 89 ("Subsequently, the Senate approved the committee
maps . . . . Upon receipt of the Senate reapportionment legislation, Governor Barnes
hurriedly signed the bill on August 24, 2001.").
198 See David Pendered and Rhonda Cook, Creative Legislators Draw New Congressional
Map, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 29, 2001, at Al ("Republicans, in the minority and shut out
of the decision -making, heaped criticism on the map and the process used to devise it. Linda
Hamrick, who coordinated the GOP redistricting team, said the map is the product 'of a group
of Democratic candidates drawing districts for themselves."').
199 Telephone Interview with Ray Holland, Ga. House of Representatives (Apr. 16, 2003)
(explaining that designing a better district for his colleague Bill Cummings and a district
with more Republicans for himself contributed to Murphy's defeat).
200 Jeff Dickerson, Is Black-Vote DilutionKey to Democrats'Survival?,ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Aug. 23, 1995, at A10.
201 Tom Baxter, Strange Company, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 20, 1995, at B2.
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legislation would all disappear should Republicans take control of
the legislature-a feat the GOP had already achieved in
neighboring South Carolina's House and both chambers in
Florida. 20 2 The two African-Americans in the House majority party
leadership would become less significant players should Democrats
become the minority. Consequently, the LBC's objective in 2001
differed dramatically from previous decades. It sought to maximize
black concentrations in districts likely to elect African-Americans
and to maximize the number of districts favoring the election of
African-Americans.
In 2001, the priority was to retain Democratic majorities. One
way to do so was to reduce black concentrations in districts thought
secure for African-American legislators and to redistribute excess
black voters to help elect white Democrats. 20 3 The goal of creating
districts with enough black voters to defeat a Republican, but not
enough to elect an African-American, was exactly the strategy that
the LBC had criticized in the past. The Senate plan reduced black
concentrations in a dozen majority-black districts so that all eleven
20 4
black senators would have more whites in their new districts.
Seven districts saw a reduction of more than ten percentage points
in the black voting age population (VAP), with the largest reduction
coming in a south DeKalb district that went from 88.4% to 62.6%
black. 20 5 Four of the districts ceased to have a black majority among
registered voters. 20 6 No Senate district was 65% black, down from
six such districts in the previous plan. 20 7 The House plan reduced
202 South CarolinaState Legislature, BALLOTPEDIA,
https:/fballotpedia.org/South-Carolina State Legislature, (last visited Mar. 9, 2018); Party
Control of FloridaState Government, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Party-control-of Florida-stategovernment (last visited Mar. 9,

2018).
203 See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of its Own
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1716 (2004) ("Part of the [Georgia] Democrats' strategy
was not only to keep the same number of majority-minority districts, but to leverage black
voting strength by diminishing the concentration of black voters in minority-dominated
districts.").
204 See id. (citing Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 470 (2003)) ('The key to the Senate
plan was, in the Court's words, to 'unpack' the black-concentrated districts, distribute the
black vote around more Democratic districts, and actually increase the number of districts
that were majority-black in voting-age population.').
205 See Charles S. Bullock III & Ronald Keith Gaddie, Voting Rights Progress in Georgia,
10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 1, 36, 37 tbl.8 (2006) (showing the change in AfricanAmerican VAP in majority-black districts produced by the first 2001 Senate plan).
206

Id.

207

See infra Table 4.
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the numbers of majority-black districts from forty-two to thirty-one,
and cut the number of districts with heavy black concentrations,
reversing the ratcheting that had taken place under the nonretrogression rule. 20 8 Districts in the 40%-49.9% black rangewhich had almost been eliminated under MAXBLACK-increased
20 9
to a dozen.

Table 4
NUMBERS OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS IN
REDISTRICTING PLANS BY THE BLACK POPULATION
PERCENTAGE IN THE DISTRICT
1964

1968

1972

1974

1980s

1990s

2002

2004

40-49.9

8

8

8

10

5

1

3

3

0

>50

2

2

2

2

8

13

13

13

15

>65

1

2

2

2

5

6

0

0

4

>80

1

2

2

2

0

0

0

0

40-49.9

15

13

14

14

13

1

12

15

7

>50

20

24

19

30

30

42

31

41

49

>65

7

12

9

15

19

21

10

16

19

>80

7

11

7

10

10

13

4

2

0

%

Senate

House

When redrawing districts in the face of daunting challenges,
Democrats employed all of the tools in the gerrymanderer's tool kit.
208
209

See infra Table 4.
See infra Table 4.
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In one instance, stacking was used. A Republican district combined
with two Democratic districts and multi-member districts (MMDs)
2 10
were reinstituted in the House a decade after their elimination.
With the coming of the Redistricting Revolution, county
boundaries ceased to be inviolable. But in rural areas where
districts consisted of multiple counties, small counties were
infrequently split.211 The new maps did not honor that tradition.
The Senate map split eighty-one counties and 189 precincts. 2 12 In
an extreme case, Candler County, with a population of only 9,577,
was divided among four House districts in order to eliminate a
Republican legislator. 2 13 Slicing and dicing rural counties outraged
the leadership in these communities. 214 Small county residents
complained that what little influence they had over a legislator was
215
further reduced when the county was not maintained as a unit.
Anger over having their counties divided among legislative districts
216
contributed to the forces that denied Roy Barnes reelection.
Democrats also engaged in the gerrymandering technique of
pairing opponents. John Linder (R), whose congressional district
extended from the northeast side of the metro Atlanta area to the
South Carolina border, found himself paired with Bob Barr (R),
whose district had reached from the west side of Atlanta to the
218
Alabama border. 217 At no point had these two districts touched.
The new Seventh District linked Linder's Gwinnett County base
with Barr's Smyrna residence in an arc that united Republican
with
precincts in parts of five counties, while extracting Democrats
21 9
Democrats.
for
seats
new
two
fashioning
of
the intention
A pairing of GOP incumbents in South Georgia backfired on
Democratic mapmakers. The new plan eliminated one of the three
congressional districts in the southern half of the state and

210 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 160.
211

Id.

HILLS, supra note 112, at 88.
Interview with Bryan Tyson (Nov. 8, 2007), supra note 196.
214 HILLS, supra note 112, at 91.
Charles S. Bullock III, It's a Sonny Day in Georgia, in MIDTERM MADNESS: THE
215
ELECTIONS OF 2002, at 177, 180 (Larry J. Sobato ed., 2003).
212
213

216

Id.

Adam Clymer, Conservatives'FactionsVie in GeorgiaPrimary,N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7,
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/O8/07/us/conservatives-factions-vie-in-georgiaprimary.html.
218 Id.
217

219

Id.
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extended Jack Kingston's First District west of 1-75 with a finger
snaking into Colquitt County to Saxby Chambliss' home. 220 In
contrast with the Barr-Linder situation, where they competed in the
GOP primary, Chambliss left the First District to Kingston, ran for
the Senate, and defeated Democratic incumbent Max Cleland.221
Pairing also eliminated Republican state legislators as thirtyfive of the seventy-six GOP House members ended up sharing
districts. 222 Nine House districts paired Republicans, four districts
forced three Republican incumbents to compete for two seats in
MMDs, and another four Republicans got paired with Democrats in
districts strongly favoring the latter. 223 Nine of the districts that
paired Republicans were over-populated by at least 4.2%.224 Sonny
Perdue, who led Senate Democrats until changing parties prior to
the 1998 election, was punished by having his district dismantled. 225
He exacted revenge by running for governor and defeating Roy
Barnes. 226
Pairing also resulted in Republicans leaving the
legislature and winning elections for state school superintendent
and a seat on the Public Service Commission-additional evidence
that Georgia was becoming a Republican state. 227
The maps showed little concern for communities of interest. The
Thirteenth Congressional District shown in Figure I was one of two
new seats reapportioned to Georgia. 228 It became known as the
"dead cat on the expressway" district for its convoluted shape that
united black concentrations in nine counties south and east of

220 David M Halbfinger & Jim Yardley, The 2002 Elections: The South; Vote Solidifies
Shift of South to the G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/07/us/the-2002-elections-the-south-vote-solidifies-shift-ofsouth-to-the- gop.html.
221

Yd.

222
Ronald Keith Gaddie & Charles S. Bullock III, From Ashcroft to Larios: Recent
RedistrictingLessons From Georgia,34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997, 1015 tbl.2 (2007).
222
224

Id. at 1014-15.
Id. at 1015 tbl.2.

225 HILLS, supra note 112, at 82, 89, 91.
226 See generally Danny Hayes & Seth C. McKee, Booting Barnes: Explainingthe Historical
Upset in the 2002 Georgia GubernatorialElection, 32 POLS. & POL'Y 708 (2004).
227 Interview with Bryan Tyson (Nov. 8, 2007), supra note 196; Interview with Bryan
Tyson, Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP, in Athens, Ga. (Feb. 10, 2011) [hereinafter
Interview with Bryan Tyson (Feb. 10, 2011)].
225 Charles S. Bullock III, Redistricting the Peach State, in THE POLITICAL BATTLE OVER
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 87, 87 (William J. Miller & Jeremy D. Walling eds., 2013)
[hereinafter Bullock, Peach State].
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Atlanta in order to get the black population above 40%, which
229
proved sufficient to send a fourth African-American to Congress.

Figure

-

1230

<-V

Some Republicans were given districts that they could win but
not effectively represent. Joey Brush saw what had been a compact
Senate district between Augusta and Athens replaced by a
monstrosity, anchored in Columbia County, but snaking westward
across nine counties before ending south of Griffin. 231 The western
part of the Brush district sat atop another GOP district, the
Id. at 94.
Plaintiffs Demonstrative Exhibits, Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.
2004) (No. 03-cv-693).
231 See BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 164-65, 164 fig.6.6 (elaborating on
the reconfigured twenty-fourth senate district).
229
230
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Sixteenth, which had been a Columbus district. 232 It now stretched
eastward across nine counties to include part of Macon before
233
ending near Perry.
As it turned out, packing was the fatal flaw in the Democrats'
state legislative plans. Operating under the assumption that courts
would defer to the legislature's actions as long as the districts were
within five percentage points of the ideal population, Democrats
systematically over-populated Republican districts while underpopulating their own districts. 234 Rather than having something
approaching a normal distribution around the ideal population, the
population distribution for seats based on population was just the
opposite, with a trough in the middle. 235 Most Republican Senate
districts were over-populated by 4.25% and ten of these were at least
4.9% above the ideal. 2 36 Democrats represented fewer people;
seventeen of thirty districts won by Democrats were underpopulated by 4% or more.2 37 Similar patterns characterized the
238
House plan.

232

Interview with Bryan Tyson (Nov. 8, 2007), supra note 196.

233

Id.

234

BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 160-61.

2.5
237

Id.; see also infra Figure 2.
BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 160-61.
Id. at 161.

238

Id.

236
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Figure 2239
ON THE BASIS OF
DISTRIBUTED
SENATE DISTRICTS
POPULATION DEVIATIONS FROM -5% TO +5%
(Each bar represents one district)

i i,ll
The maps perpetuated the Democratic advantage.

Democrats

continued to hold 58% of state House seats despite losing the
popular vote and elected thirty senators with 45% of the popular
vote. 24° The Democrats' Senate advantage proved short-lived when
four Democrats converted to the GOP in the wake of Sonny Perdue's
(R) upset victory as governor.241 Democrats also added two

239

Plaintiff's Demonstrative Exhibits, Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.

2004) (No. 03-cv-693).
240

Georgia Election Results: Official Results of the November 5, 2002 General Election,

GA. SEC'Y OF STATE,

http://sos.ga.gov/elections/election-results/2002_1105/summary.htm

Thast
updated Dec. 24, 2002).
u David S. Broder, For Perdue and Georgia GOP, It's Worth the Wait, WASH. POST (Jan.
14, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/O1/14/for-perdue-andgeorgia-gop-its-worth-the-waita740a224-lc6l-4e2c-9fd34f7656600970/?utm term=.8dcfa298ba00.
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congressional seats 242 and might have won another had one of their
candidates not had an arrest record that rivaled his office-holding
243
record.
The legislative maps sparked two kinds of challenges. DOJ
objected to three Senate districts 244 and Republicans went to court
245
challenging both the congressional and General Assembly plans.
Because the plans were such blatant partisan gerrymanders,
Georgia opted to seek approval from the District of Columbia court
rather than submitting them to George Bush's Justice Department,
where they feared partisan concerns might influence the
assessment. 246 At the hearing on the plans, DOJ accepted the
redesigns for Congress and the state House but balked at three
Senate districts reduced to less than 50% black VAP. 247 Two of the
predecessor districts had exceeded 60% and the other was above
249
55%.248 The trial court accepted DOJ's concerns.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, raising questions about
the Section 5 non-retrogression standard. 25 0 The Court explained:
[A] State may choose to create a certain number of "safe"
districts, in which it is highly likely that minority voters will
be able to elect the candidate of their choice. Alternatively, a
State may choose to create a greater number of districts in
which it is likely-although perhaps not quite as likely as
under the benchmark plan-that minority voters will be able
251
to elect candidates of their choice.

242 Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2003),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/12/08/the-great-election-grab.
242 See Bullock, Peach State, supra note 228, at 91 ("[Champ Walker] had been arrested
multiple times for offenses including leaving the scene of an accident, driving without a
license, and shoplifting. Although Walker pointed out that he had never been convicted, that
explanation did not reassure voters.").
244 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
245 Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1321-22 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
246 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 165.
247
See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 72 ('The Attorney General eventually
identified only the Senate redistricting plan as objectionable, and, in particular, proposed
Senate Districts 2, 12 and 26.").
248
See id. at 56 (showing the predecessor districts' black VAPs to be 60.58%, 55.43%, and
62.45%, respectively).
249 Id. at 93-94.
250 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 490 (2004).
25,
Id. at 480 (first citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-49 (1986); then citing
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 88-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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The state's case was helped by the favorable evaluation given the
plan by Rep. John Lewis, whose support for civil rights was beyond
question. 25 2 At his deposition, Lewis explained why he did not object
to lowering black concentrations in districts, including his own:
[Georgia] is not the same state it was. It's not the same state
that it was in 1965 or in 1975, or even in 1980 or 1990. We
[I]t's not just
have changed. We've come a great distance ....
people are
think
in Georgia, but in the American South, I
253
race.
of
preparing to lay down the burden
Further evidence that reducing black concentrations was done with
no intent to discriminate was that all but one black senator backed
the plan.25 4 Helping convince members of the LBC that reducing
black concentrations would not imperil the group's incumbents was
research done by David Epstein, an expert retained by the state,
who calculated that black candidates were more likely than not to
win so long as the district was at least 44% black in adult
255
population.
Republicans, still chafing from their inability to win control of
either legislative chamber despite winning a majority of the
statewide vote, went to court to challenge the Democratic
Representatives for the state justified overgerrymander. 256
populating Republican districts and under-populating Democratic
areas as necessary to allow South Georgia and Atlanta to retain
more legislators. 25 7 In Larios v. Cox, a three-judge federal panel
struck down the maps, reminding the state that it was unacceptable
to favor some areas at the expense of other areas. 258 The court
pointed to the 9.98% range in district populations and the underpopulating of some parts of the state to the disadvantage of other
areas. 25 9 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision, but

252

Id. at 489.

253 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 139 (citing Testimony of John Lewis,

Georgia v. Ashcroft, 204 F. Supp. 2d 4 (2002) (No. 01-civ-2111)).
254 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 129 (Oberdorfer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
255 Id. at 66 (majority opinion).
256 Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1321-22 (N.D. Ga.), al'd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
257 Id. at 1325.
258 Id. at 1338 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
259 Id. at 1322.
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Justices Stevens and Breyer volunteered that they thought that
Democrats had engaged in illegal partisan gerrymandering. 260
The GOP-controlled Senate redrew its districts, but Democrats,
who controlled the House, could not agree on a plan since
compliance with the court order would eliminate some of their
members. 26 1 Democrats refused to bring a plan up for a vote after
the GOP leader in the House bragged that he had the votes to
replace a Democratic plan with one that would both produce a
Republican majority and protect some Democratic incumbents. 26 2
When the legislature failed to redraw the maps, the court
stepped in and hired retired federal judge Joseph Hatchett, who was
assisted by redistricting expert Nathaniel Persily, a law professor
at the University of Pennsylvania. 263 Their plans reduced the
population range from 10% in the old maps to 2% and eliminated
multi-member House districts. 26 4 Critics asserted that the new
maps seemed to give little deference to county boundaries. 265 The
court directed its consultant to "reconcile[e] the demands of the
Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, and the redistricting principles
traditionally recognized by the State of Georgia." 26 6 Since creating
separate districts for each incumbent was not part of the charge, the
court's
plans
paired
twenty
senators
and
sixty-seven
representatives with three House districts containing the homes of
three legislators each. 267 Unlike the pairing done by Democrats in
the discredited maps, the new ones inflicted pain on both parties
and threw several chamber leaders into shared districts.268 The
maps especially endangered African-American members, half of

Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 950-51 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
HILLS, supra note 112, at 165.
262
See id. at 167 (detailing Republican Glenn Richardson's perspective on how he
"outmaneuvered the Democrats" by having a redistricting plan ready that a number of
Democrats preferred).
263 Gaddie & Bullock, supra note 222, at 1028.
264
Report and Recommendation of the Special Master at 18, 25, Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d
1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (No. 1:03-cv-693) (filed Mar. 15, 2004).
265 Bill Shipp, Opinion, Shipp: Redistricting: How to Get Lost with a Map, ATHENS
BANNER-HERALD, Mar. 21, 2004, at A9.
266
Order Appointing Special Master at 2, Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(No. 1:03-CV-693-CAP) (filed Mar. 1, 2004).
267 Rhonda Cook, Voting Maps to be Redrawn, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 23, 2004, at B1;
see also Proposed Legislation Districts,ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 16, 2004, at D5 (listing the
Senate and House pairings under the court's plans).
268
See Cook, supra note 267 (noting that "[t]here are now 24 Republicans and 24
Democrats pitted against colleagues").
260
261
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whom shared a district with one or two incumbents. 26 9 These
radical changes evoked a bipartisan request that the court separate
incumbents when an open seat was adjacent to a pairing. 270 The
judges granted some relief so that in the final plans, eight senators
and sixteen representatives remained paired. 271 Moving to an open
district is not an option for Georgia legislators who must live in a
272
district for a year before serving.
Not all legislators who shared a district with another incumbent
competed in the 2004 election. Among those who called it quits was
Sen. Hugh Gillis (D), who first won election to the House in 1940
and had served in the Senate continuously since 1963 when rotation
was eliminated. 273 With new districts in place, Republicans won a
majority in the House and, after some party switches, had ninetynine seats. 2 74 They also picked up four Senate seats. 2 75 White
of the
Democrats paid the price for the shift in partisan27control
6
chamber.
each
in
seat
a
gained
legislature as blacks
The shift in partisan control of the House rooted out the last
vestiges of the archaic county-unit system. Although the courts had
invalidated county-based apportionment decades earlier, 277 urban
legislators had never attained proportional power. Speaker Tom
Murphy (D) kept Atlanta-area legislators away from the most
powerful positions. In Murphy's last session as speaker (2002),
none of the Democratic Party leaders or chairs of the most powerful
committees came from Atlanta. 278 No woman served in any of these
posts 279 and, on average, those holding leadership offices had served
269 Rhonda Cook, Attorneys ProtestNew District Maps, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 20, 2004,

at El.
270

Id.

271

BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 167.

See GA. CONST. art. HI, § 2, para. 3 (requiring that members of the both the Senate and
the House "shall have been legal residents of the territory embraced within the district from
which elected for at least one year.").
273
Michelle E. Shaw, Hugh M. Gillis Sr., 94: Longest-Serving Legislator in Georgia,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 2, 2013), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-obituariesfhugh-gillislongest-serving-legislator-georgia/mlt4Fqvkj s1T6j nfgnVFPO/.
274 Nancy Badertscher, Another House Democrat Joins GOP,ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 10,
2004, at B4.
275 BULLOCK, REDISTRICTING, supra note 28, at 167.
276
See id. at 173 (noting that "black Democrats outnumbered white Democrats by .
twelve to ten in the senate, and forty-one to thirty-four in the state house").
277 See id. at 140 (summarizing the decisions leading to the end of the county-unit system).
272

278

Id. at 9.

279

GA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA 35, 103--113

(2002).
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twenty-eight years. 28 0 When Republicans organized the House in
2005, four leaders came from metro Atlanta, including a woman,
28 1
and the average seniority was eight years.
Having gained control of the legislature, Republicans turned
their attention to the congressional districts.
The plan that
emerged involved extensive consultation with the Republicans in
the congressional delegation. 28 2 Although Republican redistricting
guru Bryan Tyson showed that it was possible to draw a map that
would likely elect ten Republicans, the GOP pursued a more modest
objective of, in Rep. Lynn Westmoreland's words, "[putting] Georgia
back together" by drawing more compact districts. 28 3 Less contorted
districts were their top objective. 28 4 A second goal was to bolster
Phil Gingrey, who won a seat Democrats had designed to be one of
theirs. 28 5 A third goal was to knock off the two white Democratic
28 6
incumbents.
Republicans' mid-decade redistricting solidified Gingrey,
reducing his district's black concentration from 28.2%287 to 11.7%.288
280 Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas Buck had served since 1967. 19891990 GA. SECY OF ST. OFFICIAL & STAT. REGISTER 115. Murphy, Majority Leader Larry
Walker, and Appropriations Committee Chairman Terry Coleman had served since 1973. Id.
at 103, 117. Calvin Smyre, who chaired both the Majority Caucus and Rules Committee, had
served since 1975. Id. at 114. Speaker Pro Tempore Jack Connell had served since 1977. Id.
at 103. Finally, Majority Whip Jimmy Skipper had served since 1990. CHARLES S. BULLOCK,
III, THE GEORGIA POLITICAL ALMANAC: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 183 (1991).
281 Id. at 13 ("Four years later when Republicans won their first majority in more than 130
years, the speaker came from the Atlanta suburbs, as did the speaker pro tempore and the
chair of the powerful Rules Committee."). The positions examined here are speaker, speaker
pro tempore, majority leader, majority whip, majority caucus chair, and the chairs of the
Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means Committees.
282 See e.g. M. V. Hood III & Seth C. McKee, Trying to Thread the Needle: The Effects of
Redistricting in a Georgia CongressionalDistrict, 42 PS: POL. SC. & POLS. 679, 685-86 n.3
(2009) (discussing the coordination between General Assembly Republicans and congressman
Lynn Westmoreland).
283 Interview with Bryan Tyson (Nov. 8, 2007), supra note 196.
284 See Hood & McKee, supra note 282, at 680 ('The erstwhile Democratic map required a
high-powered microscope to divine several of the district boundaries in the greater Atlanta
metropolitan area. By contrast, the Republican map's dividing lines are visible to the naked
eye-with 34 county splits out of a total of 159 counties reduced to 19.").
285 See id. at 681 ("[T]he primary beneficiary of a more aesthetically appealing map was
Republican Phil Gingrey ....
").
286 See id. at 680 ("Georgia Republicans expected to net one or two districts: District 8 and
District 12."); cf. Interview with Bryan Tyson (Feb. 10, 2011), supra note 227 (asserting that
Republicans were primarily targeting the 12th district).
287
MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2004,
at 486 (Charles Mahtesian ed., 2003).[hereinafter BARONE & COHEN, ALMANAC 2004].
2ss MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2008,

at 488 (Charles Mahtesian ed., 2007) [hereinafter BARONE & COHEN, ALMANAC 2008].
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Districts also became much more compact. For example, the
Mountain District that Democrats had extended south into
Rockdale County now had its southern boundary at Hall, where it
had traditionally ended. 28 9 The Eleventh District, which had split
eleven of seventeen counties as it twisted and turned from Rome to
Columbus with a finger extended into Marietta, now split only three
of nine counties. 290 Focusing on two measures of compactness, the
new plan increased districts' average perimeter score to .25 and
dispersion score to .45, compared with average scores of .12 and .32
in the Democratic plan. 291 Democrat Jim Marshall's district that
had run east-west returned to the north-south axis traditional for
this district, 292 and Republicans reduced its black percentage from
39.8%293 to 32.4%.294 The other white Democrat, John Barrow, saw
his Athens home removed from the district as it shifted south and
picked up more of rural middle Georgia. 295 As a result of
Republicans not giving top priority to eliminating the white
Democrats, Marshall survived until 2010296 while Barrow made it
297
until 2014, when another redistricting ended his tenure.
VI. GOP SUPER-MAJORITY
Receipt of the 2010 Census marked the first time that
Republicans redistricted both the General Assembly and the state's
congressional seats. The GOP had firm control of Georgia as the
last Democrats holding statewide office vacated their posts in 2010,
leaving Republicans with 36 Senate, 113 House, and 8 congressional
seats. 298 In sharp contrast with Democrats a decade earlier, who
tried desperately to hold onto a majority, the GOP had loftier
ambitions. They hoped to emerge with super-majorities, that is,
289
See Hood & McKee, supra note 93, at 680 fig.1 (depicting the difference between the
old Tenth District and the new Ninth District).
290

Id.

291
293

BuLLoCK, REDISTRICTING, supranote 28, at 169 tbl.6.4.
Hood & McKee, supranote 93, at 681.
BARONE & COHEN, ALMANAC 2004, supra note FS, at 467.

294

BARONE & COHEN, ALMANAC 2008, supra note FT, at 481.

292

295 Blake Aued, John Barrow is Moving Back to Athens, FLAGPOLE (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://flagpole.com/news/in-the-loop/john-barrow-is-moving-back-to-athens.
296 Josephine Bennett, Marshall Loses Seat in Congress, GA. PUB. BROADCASTING (Nov.
2, 2010), http://www.gpb.org/news/2010/11/03/marshall-loses-seat-in-congress.
297 Blake Aued, Why the Republicans Won Big Again, FLAGPOLE (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://flagpole.com/news/city-dope/2014/11/12/why-the-republicans-won-big-again.
299 Bullock, Peach State, supra note 228, at 94.
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two-thirds of the seats in each chamber, and to defeat John Barrow,
the last white Democrat in the congressional delegation. 299
The new legislative plans bolstered black influence in districts
that currently had African-American legislators. For the first time,
all four African-Americans serving in Congress had districts in
which most registered voters were black. 30 0 Barrow saw his district
transformed again. The new map removed Savannah with its black
neighborhoods and replaced them with the Republican
suburbanites of Augusta and parts of rural southeast Georgia.30 1
Barrow migrated with his district, moving from Savannah to
Augusta. 30 2 The last rural, white Democrat in the upper chamber
of the General Assembly, Dean of the Senate George Hooks, who
had served for twenty-two years following a decade in the House,
retired after his district in the slow-growing southwest quadrant
30 3
was split in two.
Republicans, much like Democrats a decade earlier, were allowed
to see their districts, but not the entire maps, and request changes
prior to the release of the maps. 304 Democrats criticized the GOP
handiwork, much as Republicans had criticized Democrats a decade
earlier. Rep. Scott Holcomb (D) claimed that his new district
ignored communities of interest, packed African-Americans, and
paired him with another Democrat. 305 House Minority Leader
Stacey Abrams (D) offered a broader critique, charging that the
GOP maps "silence whites and isolate minorities into enclaves
where no racial coalition can exist. This amounts to a resegregation
of Georgia into a party of white Republicans and black Democrats,
299

Id. at 94, 97-99.

300

Id. at 99.

Dan Hirschhorn, Ga. Redistricting Plan Imperils Barrow, POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2011),
https://www.politico.com/story/2011/08/ga-redistricting-plan-imperils-barrow-061861.
302
Russ Bynum, John Barrow Leaves Savannah for Augusta, SAVANNAH MORNING
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.savannahnow.com/article/20120405/NEWS/304059795.
303
See Kristina Torres, George Hooks Leaves Georgia's Board of Regents, ATLANTA J.CONST. (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regiona-govt--politics/george-hooksleaves-georgia-board-regents/SGyTRPSWbF9V36LaGIOMSI/ ("[Hooks] retired from the state
Legislature at the end of 2012 as one of its longest-serving members. A former state
representative first elected to the General Assembly in 1980, he left as Dean of the Senate, a
.01

title denoting his tenure in that chamber .... Hooks . . . was one of the Legislature's few

remaining white rural Democrats, and his district had just been redrawn into a Republican
stronghold.").
304
Kristina Torres, Lawmakers Draw New Maps Atop Political Minefield, ATLANTA J.CONST., Aug. 14, 2011, at A14.
105 Scott Holcomb, A Plan to Oust White Democrats at Capital, ATLANTA J. -CONST., Aug.
19, 2011, at A17.
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leaving Latinos and Asians to fend for themselves." 30 6 Democrats
tried but failed to create "influence districts," or districts with too
few blacks to elect an African-American but sufficient to elect 0a7
3
white Democrat who would be responsive to black concerns.
Black legislators' concern that the GOP plan would defeat white
Democrats showed how far the black members had migrated from
the 1991 alliance with Republicans, when they devised maps that
Every Democrat in the General
defeated white Democrats.
Assembly voted nay on the maps. 30 8 To hold ranks, Minority Leader
Abrams threatened that any Democrat who voted for the GOP plans
would get a primary challenge in 2012.309
The state had concerns in 2011 much like those in 2001. The
attorney general and the creators of Georgia's maps belonged to
opposing parties and the state feared that politics might torpedo the
maps at DOJ.310 To expedite the process, should an appeal from an
unfavorable DOJ ruling be necessary, Georgia adopted a dual
submission strategy: sending the plans to DOJ as well as the
District of Columbia District Court. 311 The new plans increased the
numbers of districts with black majorities among registrants by two
congressional districts, three Senate districts, and six House
districts. 3 12 Both the Senate and House had record numbers of
majority-black districts. 3 13 While these Republican maps did not
maximize black concentrations, as had been done under
MAXBLACK, by giving these districts black majorities they
solidified GOP strength in adjoining districts. 3 14 DOJ acted more
quickly than the court and for the first time since passage of the

306 Bullock, Peach State, supra note 228, at 103 (citing Stacey Abrams, Integrate, Don't
Resegregate,ATL. J.-CONST., Dept. 8, 2011, at A14).
307 Jim Galloway et al., Redrawn Districts May Polarize More, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug.
28, 2011, at Al.
308 Kristina Torres & Aaron Gould Sheinin, Political Boundaries Easily Win Approval,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 19, 2011, at Bl.
309

Id.

310

Id.
Bullock, Peach State, supra note 228, at 106.

311
312

CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III & RONALD KEITH GADDIE, GEORGIA POLITICS IN A STATE OF

CHANGE 160-61 (2d ed. 2013).
313 See supra Table 4.
314 See Bullock, Peach State, supra note 228, at 102 ("If the new districts perform as
expected based on past election results, Republicans will sweep everything except the four
districts represented by African Americans.").
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initial Voting Rights Act, Georgia's maps secured Section 5 approval
3 15
on the first try.
The GOP achieved only one of its goals in 2012 as it added two
Senate seats to secure two-thirds of the seats. 316 In the House,
Republicans came up one seat short at 119.317 Hard-working John
Barrow dodged a bullet when the Republicans' nominee refused to
debate Barrow and had several slips of the tongue. 3 18 Barrow
survived in a district that Republican presidential candidate Mitt
Romney carried with 55% of the vote, achieving a Cook Partisan
Voting Index of R +9319 only to lose in 2014.320
African-Americans added five House seats and held their own in
the other two delegations. 321 The Democratic delegations were now
overwhelmingly African-American after the 2012 election, including
thirteen of eighteen Democratic senators, forty-seven of sixty
representatives, and four of five members of Congress. 322
Democratic legislators were also overwhelmingly from urban areas,
and were beginning to chip away at the GOP dominance of Atlanta
suburbs by winning some older areas experiencing population
diversification. 323
Election results from 2016, augmented by special elections in
2017, suggest strongly that the GOP tide that had risen largely
unabated for more than three decades has crested. The GOP lost
its Senate super-majority in a 2017 special election. 324 In 2016,
Democrats took back one House seat in Gwinnett County and came

Id. at 107.
Georgia State Senate Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Georgia-State-Senate-elections,-2012 (last visited May 30, 2018).
317 GeorgiaHouse of Representatives Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Georgia-House-ofRepresentativeselections,_2012 (last visited May
30, 2018).
118 Larry Peterson, John Barrow Says Lee Anderson is Ducking 12 h Congressional
DistrictDebates, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012),
http://www.savannahnow.com/article/20120913/NEWS/309139785.
315
316

319
DAVID WASSERMAN, THE COOK POLITICAL REPORT, INTRODUCING THE 2012 COOK
POLITICAL REPORT PARTISAN VOTER INDEX 8 (2012),

http://redistricting.ls.edu/files/MD%20shapiro /2020170531%/20MSJ%20app /20exhXX.pdf.
320 Aued, supra note 295.
321 Dan O'Connor, interview with the author, June 11, 2018.
322 The House had one black Republican and one Hispanic Democrat leaving a dozen white
Democrats.
323 Dan O'Connor interview with the author, June 11, 2018.
324 Max Greenwood, Georgia GOP Loses State Senate Supermajority, THE HILL (Dec. 6,
2017), http://thehill.comhomenews/state-watch/363501 -georgia-gop-loses-state-senatesupermajority.
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within a handful of votes of winning another. 325 Special elections to
replace two Republicans in the Athens area saw both snared by
326
Democrats.
In 2015, the General Assembly rushed to help two Republicans
hard-pressed in the previous election. Legislation tweaked the
endangered districts to swap out Democrats for Republicans in
neighboring districts. 327 Democrats went to court to challenge these
328
mid-decade remaps.
VII. CONSEQUENCES
Redistricting served as a catalyst. It transformed a legislature
dominated by white, rural, male Democrats into a body with a
Republican majority in which most Democrats are AfricanAmericans. The growth of the GOP and the advances made by
African-Americans are closely related. 329 Rural legislators became
scarcer with each redistricting, and women now exceed 25% of the
membership. 330 In the redistricting battles of the 1980s and 1990s,
Republicans and black Democrats joined hands across the
ideological chasm. Aided by the courts, as in Busbee v. Smith, and
DOJ's Section 5 reviews, these two groups, which even when united
fell far short of a legislative majority, made gains at the expense of
white Democrats and began the unraveling of the Democratic
majority.

325

See James Salzer, Democrats Win Georgia Senate Seat, the House is Largely a Wash

Tuesday, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--

politics/democrats-win-georgia-senate-seat-the-house-largely-washtuesday/LEyDMBnweGOZ54oL7Q5YnI/ (noting Sam Park's victory in Gwinnett and Donna
McLeod's last-minute loss to incumbent Joyce Chandler).
See Maya Prabhu, Georgia Democrats Pick Up Three Legislative Seats in Special
326
Elections, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt-

-politics/georgia-democrats-pace-pick-three-legislative -seat s-special(reporting victories by Deborah Gonzalez and
elections/9KdkpqNX1CrVKyfal4qj7N/
Jonathan Wallace).
327 See Kristina Torres, Lawsuit Claims GA House Districts Drawn to Remove Minority
Voters, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--

politics/lawsuit-claims-house-districts-drawn-remove-minorityvoters/vgjgym4Y2zCgbbTieeIJ3K/ (describing litigation challenging the gerrymander).
328
329

33o

Id.
See generally M.V. HOOD III ET AL., THE RATIONAL SOUTHERNER (2012).
See Women in State Legislaturesfor 2018, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 14,

2018), http://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislators/womens-legislative-network/womenin-state-legislatures-for-2018.aspx (showing that Georgia's state chambers are 26.7%
women).
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The transformation began with the initial round of redistricting,
which ushered in the first African-Americans in decades and saw
the first urban Republicans winning office. Maps introduced in
1965, 1993, 2005, and 2013 boosted Republican presence in the
General Assembly. 331 African-Americans made gains under maps
implemented in 1965, 1975, 1993, 2003, and 2013. Gains for both
groups tend to be more pronounced in the House than in the Senate
with its much smaller membership. During the 1970s, neither
group added many seats, and even after some initial gains they
ended the decade with about the same number of seats, a pattern
that has persisted for African-American Senate seats. Thanks to
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the non-retrogression
standard used when assessing the likely impact of plans, new maps
did not reduce the black presence in the legislature. The same
cannot be said for Republicans who saw their ranks in the House
reduced in the wake of Watergate and the 2001 Democratic
gerrymander.

331

See infra Figure 3.
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Figure 3
BLACK AND REPUBLICAN SEATS IN THE HOUSE AND
SENATE, 1961-2017, WITH VERTICAL LINES SHOWING WHEN
MAJOR REDISTRICTING PLANS TOOK EFFECT
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Far more dramatic than the evidence that redistricting helped
end the reign of white Democrats in the General Assembly are the
results for the congressional delegation. Each addition of an
African-American member of Congress coincided with a new plan
designed to facilitate the election of a black congressman-a
phenomenon replicated across the South. Rejection of the state plan
in 1972 helped Andy Young become the first black Georgian to go to
Congress since Jefferson Long left a century earlier.3 32 Sanford
Bishop and Cynthia McKinney won districts in which the black
332 See MAURINE CHRISTOPHER, AMERICA'S BLACK CONGRESSMEN 267-69 (1971) (listing

Jefferson Long as the only black congressman from Georgia before 1972).
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population had been maximized to all but assure the election of an
African-American. The district that elected David Scott in 2002 had
nearly equal numbers of blacks and whites, 333 which facilitated the
nomination of an African-American in the Democratic primary
while making it unlikely that a Republican could get a large enough
share of the white vote to win the general election.
Bleaching neighboring districts to create the ones won by Bishop
and McKinney cleared the way for three GOP victories in the whiter
districts, boosting the Republicans to their largest congressional
delegation from Georgia since 1874. In 1994, Republicans gained
three more seats, in part as a reaction to the support that
Democratic representatives had given to tax increases in President
Clinton's deficit reduction package, and in part due to the
unprecedented changes in districts necessitated by the creation of
334
the majority-black districts two years earlier.
Republicans effectively exploited the opportunities offered by
federal demands that districts have equal populations and that
African-Americans get opportunities to elect their preferred
candidates. Shifting legislative seats from counties to where people
lived paved the way for GOP gains. Republicans joined forces with
ambitious African-Americans. Republicans operating alone could
3-11 See BARONE & COHEN, ALMANAC 2004, supra note 287, at 491 (showing a 42.1% white
concentration and a 40.7% black concentration in Rep. Scott's Thirteenth District).
334 Representatives Buddy Darden (D-7) and Don Johnson (D-10) voted for the Clinton
bill and it seriously hurt their reelection prospects. Kenneth J. Cooper, Democrats on
Defensive in Georgia Where GOP Has High Expectations, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 1994),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/10/28/democrats-on-defensive-ingeorgia-where-gop-has-high-expectations/c9459eoa-Ob8o-4e8b-adOf4c335d52027b/?utm term=.1b7e2f8b433d. The district Johnson represented had gone down
from 23% to 18% black as a result of the 1992 plan. See supraTable 1. In the Eighth District,
which also elected a Republican in 1994, the black population had declined from 36% to 21%.
See supra Table 1. The Seventh District in northwest Georgia actually became more heavily
black with the new plan, increasing from 9% to 13%. See supra Table 1. However, Darden
found himself representing many new constituents. Cobb County, Darden's home and 62%
of the district's population in the old map, was divided. See BARONE & UJIFUSA, ALMANAC
1994, supra note 151, at 348 (noting that the district only included part of western Cobb
County, while also including a stretch from LaGrange to Rome and to Cartersville to the
east). Three other counties Darden represented were removed and the district expanded to
include seven new counties. See BARONE & UJIFUSA, ALMANAC 1992, supra note 151, at 318
(describing the old Seventh District as being dominated by Cobb County, while also including
Dalton and the Georgia suburbs of Chattanooga, Tennessee). This reconfiguration nicely
illustrates that a major factor in Democrats losing control of the House, where they had had
majorities for all but four of the previous sixty-four years, was Democratic incumbents having
to try to withstand a Republican wave election in districts where the Democrats had had little
opportunity to develop ties.
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not have gotten the number of favorable districts they achieved by
having black legislators like Julian Bond, Cynthia McKinney, and
Tyrone Brooks intercede with DOJ. Partisans asking the courts for
more seats have yet to succeed. But as Republicans recognized as
early as 1981, blacks asking for more seats had a good chance for
success at DOJ, but also in federal court. Had the counsel of black
legislative leaders like Michael Thurmond, Calvin Smyre, and
Eugene Walker prevailed in 1991 when they rejected calls for
MAXBLACK, 335 the bitterness that eroded the bonds of a biracial
Democratic Party might have been avoided. In light of the partisan
realignment that has swept the South, Republicans would almost
certainly have gotten the upper hand in the legislature but that
shift might have been delayed several more electoral cycles, as it
was in ten other southern legislative chambers. 336 Moreover, in the
absence of MAXBLACK, Republicans would have made fewer gains
since there would have been fewer bleached districts.
Democratic hubris also contributed to the emergence of a GOP
behemoth. In the effort not simply to retain majorities, but to
punish Republicans by pairing as many incumbents as possible in
2001, Democrats sowed dragon's teeth that generated the
Republican challengers who defeated the sitting governor and U.S.
senator.
Georgia's redistricting experiences have also helped shape the
law in this area beginning with Wesberry v. Sanders, which
extended the one-person, one-vote standard from state legislatures
to the U.S. House. Georgia v. United States made clear that
redistricting plans had to secure approval pursuant to Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act and that the jurisdiction had the
responsibility of proving that the new plan did not discriminate
against minorities. In Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court
provided clarity to the concerns raised in Shaw v. Reno, explaining
that it was not the shape alone that was the problem, but that if
race trumped all other considerations when designing a plan, the
Holmes, ReapportionmentStrategies, supra note 118, at 192.
Republicans did not gain majorities in the following chambers until after they took
over the Georgia General Assembly: Alabama Senate (2009); Alabama House (2011);
Arkansas Senate and House (2013); Louisiana Senate (2012); Louisiana House (2010);
Mississippi House and Senate (2012); North Carolina Senate (2011); Tennessee House (2009).
Partisan Composition of State Legislatures 2002-2014, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevotelegiscontrol_2002-2014.pdf (last visited June 1,
2018).
33

336
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plan was unconstitutional. In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Supreme
Court approved reductions in black concentrations, thus
challenging the non-retrogression standard that had guided reviews
of new plans under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Larios v.
Cox moved consideration of state legislative plans toward requiring
narrower tolerances of population deviations by challenging the
idea that plans with deviations less than + 5% offered a safe harbor.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss4/4

48

